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The closer economic integration of the world economy is viewed with fear and scepticism by
many. In particular, the e￿ects for employment and wages of workers in developed countries are
controversially discussed in the public debate on the consequences of globalisation. International
competitive pressures and footloose multinational enterprises (MNEs) are widely feared to bring
down wages and endanger jobs in the western world. 1
In this context, national regulations that add to the rigidity of the labour market have come
under growing pressures. Increasing labour market ￿exibility has been one of the major goals of
recent reforms in OECD countries. The political debates surrounding these reforms frequently
discuss the necessity of a ￿exible labour market for coping successfully with the challenges of
globalisation. For instance, the Kok report (2004), designed to monitor the achievements to-
wards the Lisbon goals of the European Union, identi￿es increased global competition as a
major challenge for Europe and calls for ￿nding a new balance between ￿exibility and security
on the labour market. And in a recent report the academic advisory council at the German
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology concludes that globalised markets require addi-
tional labour market ￿exibility in Germany (BMWi, 2006). In this regard, the relatively rigid
labour markets in Continental Europe have been contrasted with those of the UK and the US
characterised by a high degree of ￿exibility.
Despite of the great public interest in the issue, academics have typically analysed the e￿ects
of labour market regulations in closed economy settings abstracting from international linkages.
On the other hand, trade economists almost always rely on models with fully ￿exible labour
markets and ignore possible e￿ects of trade on employment. 2 As a consequence, surprisingly
little is known about the e￿ect of national labour market regulation in a globalised world econ-
omy.
A notable exception is the important work of Davis (1998). He considers trade between a
￿exible-wage ‘America’ and a rigid-wage ‘Europe’ in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework and shows
1Scheve and Slaughther (2001) provide a comprehensive summary of the perceptions of American workers
about Globalisation.
2See Davidson and Matusz (2004) for a discussion of the likely reasons for the focus on full-employment models.
2that factor markets can not be considered in isolation when goods markets are linked globally.
In his paper, the global equilibrium is characterised by Factor-Price-Equalisation (FPE) across
countries. The minimum wage in Europe pins down wages in both countries. European workers
have to absorb the full unemployment level of the integrated economy. Hence, a move from
autarky to free trade will prop up American wages and will sharply increase European unem-
ployment. Davis (1998) also shows that the ￿xed minimum wage in Europe will shield American
wages against shocks originating from factor accumulation in Europe while the reverse is not
true.
In a recent paper, Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006) consider somewhat less stark institutional
assumptions. They postulate the existence of fair wage constraints in both economies. Asymme-
tries arise due to di￿erent attitudes towards wage inequality. The paper develops an integrated
equilibrium concept for their type of model and shows that while the central message of Davis
persists, some results depend on the speci￿c model framework.
The papers mentioned make use of the Heckscher-Ohlin model with perfectly competitive prod-
uct markets and, hence, focus on inter-industry trade. However, trade ￿ows between developed
countries and regions, such as Europe and the US, are largely characterised by simultaneous
exports and imports of similar products. This is generally attributed to the existence of scale
economies. A second distinctive feature of the modern world economy is the widespread impor-
tance of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Over the last two decades or so FDI has risen sharply,
both in absolute terms but also relative to the levels of GDP and trade. 3 In this context, con-
cerns haven been raised that multinational activity of ￿rms could have detrimental e￿ects on
the regulatory capacities of countries competing for FDI. Importantly, modelling (horizontal)
multinational enterprises (MNEs) requires positive trade costs which cause the Factor-Price-
Equalisation Theorem invoked by Davis (1998) to break down.
Against this background, the present paper adds to the scarce existing literature by studying
labour market outcomes in a model of intra-industry trade between a rigid-wage Europe and a
￿exible-wage America, in which multinational enterprises arise endogenously. Downward wage
rigidity is simply modelled as a lower bound on wages and might re￿ect various institutions such
3For an overview of stylised facts on FDI see, for instance, chapter 1 of Navaretti and Venables (2004).
3as explicit minimum wages, unemployment bene￿ts, unions etc. Trade costs are non-negligible
and the model therefore concentrates on the empirically important case where factor prices do
not equalise across trading partners. 4 The basic framework is adopted from Markusen and
Venables (1998) who study the model under perfectly competitive factor markets. Firms can
either enter as national enterprises producing in one country and possibly exporting to the other.
Alternatively, multinational enterprises will set up a headquarter in one country but maintain
production facilities in both. Hence, the focus lies on horizontal direct investment which rep-
resents the bulk of FDI and is of particular importance in the analysis of similar developed
countries.
The e￿ects of divergent national labour market institutions in the globalised economy are con-
trasted with those derived in a closed economy setting and those without allowing for the
presence of multinational ￿rms. The results suggest that the negative e￿ect of a one-sided wage
￿oor on unemployment in Europe is much larger with positive levels of intra-industry trade than
in a closed economy framework. Domestic production is substituted by imports from America.
Hence, labour demand falls more rapidly and unemployment soars. The problem exacerbates
itself as income and, hence, demand will fall more rapidly with higher unemployment rates caus-
ing a further decline in European production.
Interestingly, multinational ￿rms do not worsen this e￿ect but generally help to mitigate it.
They are less a￿ected by the one-sided minimum wage than European national ￿rms as parts
of their costs are incurred in terms of foreign labour. This allows them to operate for a wider
range of (implicit) minimum wages. European labour bene￿ts as consumption is met with local
production. Hence, in contrast to public perception the study suggest that (horizontal) MNEs
can actually help to alleviate negative e￿ects arising from global competition in the presence of
one-sided labour market institutions.
Even though factor prices are not equalised across countries, America sees its wage rate rising in
4Oslington (2002) analyses asymmetric wage rigidity in a Heckscher-Ohlin model in which Europe is specialised
in the skill-intensive industry. FPE then also breaks down and Europe is left with a lower skill premium than
America. The paper shows that some of Davis’ results will no longer hold in that case but con￿rms the overarching
message that factor markets can not be considered in isolation when goods markets are global. In contrast to the
present paper, Oslington (2002) considers inter-industry trade and abstracts from MNEs. Moreover, in a model of
two developed countries (Europe and America) non-negligible trade frictions may arguably be a more important
reason for factor prices not to be equalised than dissimilar endowments.
4the open economy setting with the introduction of a minimum wage in Europe. Owing to a sort
of home market e￿ect, American wages can actually rise above the minimum wage rate even
though countries are otherwise identical. The exact magnitude of these e￿ects depends crucially
on the level of trading barriers and the rate of the minimum wage. In particular, one-sided
labour market rigidities are likely to have more severe e￿ects when trading barriers are low and,
hence, foreign competition is ￿erce. However, trade liberalization can in principle also lower
unemployment when the market is dominated by exporting ￿rms only.
The paper also illustrates that America is indeed insulated from any shocks caused by European
factor accumulation. On contrary, factor accumulation in America has marked impacts on both
countries with the exact direction depending on the level of the minimum wage and the types of
￿rms active in the corresponding equilibrium. In fact, increases in American labour supply can
actually boost American wages by enhancing the competitiveness of national ￿rms in a globalised
world.
While national labour market institutions are typically examined in closed economy models, the
present analysis therefore suggests that their e￿ects do strongly depend on global goods market
linkages. Divergent institutional features markedly in￿uence each other in a globalised world
economy even if factor markets are fully national.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model frame-
work. Partial equilibrium results are derived in section 3, while section 4 presents the numerical
simulation of the general equilibrium. In the following section, the e￿ects of the level of trading
costs on the key results are considered. Section 6 analyses the impact of local factor accumulation
on labour market outcomes in the two countries. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Basic Model
The model5 studies two countries, which I call in accordance with Davis (1998) ‘Europe’ ( e) and
‘America’ (a), producing two homogeneous goods, X and Y . Two factors of production exist,
labour (L) and resources (R). While resources are speci￿c to the Y sector, labour is mobile
5As noted earlier, the model framework draws heavily on Markusen and Venables (1998). The only di￿erence
is the introduction of a minimum wage in Europe.
5between sectors but immobile across countries.
In the following, countries will be denoted by subscripts ( i;j). Good Y is freely traded and
chosen as the numeraire of the model; consequently its price is normalised to one. Y is sold in
a perfectly competitive market and its production function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas
Yi = L￿
iyR1￿￿
i with 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 and i = a;e: (1)
where Ri is the resource endowment of country i. Provided that prices are fully ￿exible, the













However, while American wages are assumed to be fully ￿exible, they are subjected to a binding
minimum wage in Europe
we = w: (4)
Note that this also implies that the labour demand of the Y sector in Europe is ￿xed by equation
(2) and the parameters ￿, Re and we.
The X good is sold in an imperfectly competitive market. There are four di￿erent types of po-
tential entrants in the market; (1) national ￿rms located in America, (2) national ￿rms located
in Europe, (3) multinational ￿rms headquartered in America, and (4) multinationals headquar-
tered in Europe. National ￿rms produce in one of the two countries only and potentially export
to the other. They are denoted with the superscript n. Horizontal multinationals, marked with
the superscript m, have their headquarters in either of the two countries but maintain produc-
tion facilities in both countries. Fixed costs consist of factor prices for G units of labour for
the headquarter and F units of labour for a factory. It is further assumed that producing a
6As pointed out in the original work of Markusen and Venables (1998), R serves to add some convexity to the
model. Higher levels of X production will increase the cost of labour in terms of Y . Hence, labour supply to the
non-competitive sector is increasing in wi.
6unit of X requires c units of labour. Note that production technologies are identical in the two
countries. An exporting ￿rm will additionally have to hire t units of labour in order to ship a
unit of output across the border.
Let Xk
ij denote the amount of output that a type k = n;m ￿rm based in i supplies to country
j. Since national enterprises undertake all their production in their base country, the demand
of one national ￿rm headquartered in i for country i’s labour is
cXn
ii + (c + t)Xn
ij + G + F with i 6= j: (5)
On contrary, a national ￿rm based in j will not demand any labour in i. A multinational based
in i will use labour for maintaining the headquarter and a factory in i. Additionally, it requires
labour for producing output for the i market while supply to the j market is met by local
production. Hence, labour demand of one multinational based in i for labour of country i can
be written as
cXm
ii + G + F: (6)
Finally, a multinational enterprise based in j requires labour from country i to support the local
factory as well as to produce for the local market. Demand for country i’s labour is then
cXm
ji + F : (7)
Let ni and mi denote the number of active national ￿rms and multinationals, respectively, with
a headquarter in country i. The sum of labour demands from the di￿erent types of ￿rms plus
the unemployed units of labour, Ui, have to equal the factor endowment. Hence, the labour
market clearing condition can be written as
Li = Ui + Liy + ni(cXii + (c + t)Xn
ij + G + F) + mi(cXm
ii + G + F) + mj(cXm
ji + F); (8)
where Ua = 0 due to the assumption of fully ￿exible American wages.
Since pro￿ts are driven to zero in the (long-run) equilibrium, national income Mi will solely
7consist of factor rewards
Mi = wi(Li ￿ Ui) + riRi; (9)
which accrue to a representative consumer in each country. The agent faces a Cobb-Douglas






with Zi denoting utility. Xic and Yic are the respective consumption levels of the two goods.





Yic = (1 ￿ ￿)Mi; (12)
where pi denotes the price of good X in country i. The goods market equilibrium in sector X
requires demand Xic to equal total supply. The latter is given by the sum of output levels of






The ￿rms compete in Cournot fashion. Marginal revenue of a type k ￿rm based in i serving
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the price elasticity of demand while sk
ij denotes the respective proportional markup of prices
over marginal costs. With Cobb-Douglas preferences the price elasticity of demand is one and











8Pro￿t maximisation implies that marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Written in complemen-
tary slackness form, the pricing equations are given as follows
pi(1 ￿ sn
ii) ￿ wic; (Xn
ii ￿ 0); (15)
pj(1 ￿ sn
ij) ￿ wi(c + t); (Xn
ij ￿ 0); (16)
pi(1 ￿ sm
ii ) ￿ wic; (Xm
ii ￿ 0); (17)
pj(1 ￿ sm
ij) ￿ wjc; (Xm
ij ￿ 0): (18)
Free entry will drive pro￿ts to zero in the long-run equilibrium. The combination of ￿rm types
active is therefore determined by four zero-pro￿t conditions. They simply state for each ￿rm
type that markup revenues have to be equal to or less than ￿xed costs. Complementary variables




















ae ￿ wa(G + F) + weG; (ma ￿ 0): (22)
The general equilibrium of the model is then determined through a system of equalities and
inequalities that solve simultaneously for the endogenous variables of the model. Output levels
in X sector are associated with pricing inequalities (15) - (18) together with the markup formula
in (14). The zero pro￿t conditions (19)-(22) determine the number of each ￿rm type active in
equilibrium. Income levels are given by (9) while the price of good X is established through
equation (11) in combination with (13). Finally, the wage rate in America and the unemployment
rate in Europe are determined by the labour market clearing condition in (8) together with labour
demand from the Y sector, equation (2), while the rental rate of R is associated with equation
(3).
93 Intuition from Partial Equilibrium Analysis
Before calculating the general equilibrium of the model numerically, I start with deriving results
in a partial equilibrium setting. This is meant to provide intuition for the general equilibrium
results reported in the following sections.
Equations (2) and (8) show that the American wage rate and the unemployment rate in Eu-
rope depend crucially on labour demand originating in the X sector. The latter, in turn, will
depend on the type (and number) of ￿rms active in equilibrium as well as the output level of
an individual ￿rm. In the ￿exible wage setting, expanding X production draws labour from
the Y sector thereby increasing the R=L ratio in the competitive sector. Wages will increase
as a result. With wages ￿xed at a (binding) minimum wage, labour demand of Y is ￿xed by
equation (2). The units of unemployed labour in Europe are given by total endowment minus
labour demands from the Y and X sector.
In the following, the e￿ects of the introduction of a binding (implicit) minimum wage in Europe,
i.e. an increase in we, are separately analysed for the two crucial determinants of labour demand
in the X sector. First, the number of active ￿rms is kept exogenous and the e￿ect of a one-sided
wage increase on output levels is studied. I abstract from any general equilibrium e￿ects on
income and do not consider feedback e￿ects from the labour market. The in￿uence in a closed
economy setting is compared to the e￿ect in an open economy setting with and without multi-
national enterprises. Second, the e￿ects of a one-sided wage increase on (potential) pro￿ts of
the four types of ￿rms are considered. This will help to understand what kind of ￿rms are likely
to arise in equilibrium and how the location decisions of ￿rms are in￿uenced by the introduction
of a minimum wage in Europe.
3.1 E￿ects of an Increase in the European Wage on Output
Suppose ￿rst that the types (and number) of ￿rms active in equilibrium are ￿xed. For con-
creteness I will assume that the two countries are identical with respect to the number of active
10￿rms.7 Since demand functions derived from a Cobb-Douglas utility function are not suitable to
study monopoly I further assume that ni = nj = n ￿ 2 (and mi = mj = n ￿ 2 if multinationals


































If the right-hand side is positive, the equations hold with equality, otherwise output is zero.
Consider ￿rst an equilibrium in which only non-exporting national ￿rms are active. I will refer
to this scenario as the closed economy setting. Abstracting from general equilibrium e￿ects,






Since just national ￿rms producing for the domestic market are active, only the production level
Xn
ii is of interest to country i’s labour demand. Now consider the e￿ect of an increase in we on
domestic production Xn
ee. The elasticity of output with respect to wages, denoted "c, in a closed













Next, consider an open economy with positive levels of intra-industry. National ￿rms do export
but multinational ￿rms are not present. A national ￿rm based in country i produces for both
markets and labour demand depends on Xn
ii and Xn
ij. Equations (11), (23) and (24) can be
7The assumption does not a￿ect the general results of this section but helps to clean up the somewhat messy
expressions.
11solved simultaneously to ￿nd
Xn
ii =
￿Mi(2n ￿ 1)(nwj(c + t) ￿ c(n ￿ 1)wi)
(nwj(c + t) + cnwi)2 ; (29)
Xn
ji =
￿Mi(2n ￿ 1)(cnwi ￿ (n ￿ 1)wj(c + t))
(nwj(c + t) + cnwi)2 : (30)
Now consider the wage elasticity of output of a national ￿rm based in Europe with respect to

































= "oese + "oasa; (31)
where "oi is the wage elasticity of output produced for market i and si denotes the share of
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(c + t)we((n ￿ 1)twe + c(wa ￿ 3nwa + (n ￿ 1)we))
(we(c + t) + cwa)(c(nwa ￿ we(n ￿ 1)) ￿ twe(n ￿ 1))
: (33)
While the expression looks quite messy the following result can be established
Proposition 1. In an open economy setting with nonnegative intra-industry trade the wage
elasticities of production for both markets of a national ￿rm based in Europe, "oe and "oa, are
smaller than or equal to -1. Hence, the elasticities are smaller than in the closed economy
setting. The elasticities are furthermore decreasing in we.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The proposition shows that in an open economy one-sided changes in the wage rate will
have more severe e￿ects on production (and, hence, labour demand) than in a closed economy.
The wage elasticities are generally smaller the larger the wage level already is. Intuitively, an
12increase in European wages only a￿ects ￿rms based in Europe. Therefore, ￿rms will have to
reduce output not only because of the increase in marginal costs but also due to the deteriora-
tion of their competitiveness relative to their American counterparts. The latter e￿ect is clearly
absent in a closed economy setting.
Now consider a market in which multinational ￿rms are active. Pricing equations for multina-
tional ￿rms and national ￿rms serving their local markets are exactly identical because both
￿rms have a factory in the country and, hence, face identical marginal costs. Multinational pro-
duction relevant for the European labour market is given by Xm
ee and Xm
ae. The wage elasticity
of multinational production will be the same as the wage elasticity of production for the market
in Europe of a national ￿rm based in Europe. If a multinational competes only with other
multinationals or with national ￿rms based in Europe, the output elasticity will therefore equal
￿1, i.e. it will be identical to the case of a closed economy. When competing with exporting
￿rms the elasticity will equal "oe.
However, one crucial di￿erence exists when comparing MNEs to national ￿rms. The multina-
tional has an outside option to produce the output in its oversea facility and then reimport
it. It will do so whenever marginal production costs in Europe will exceed those in America,
i.e. whenever wec > wa(c + t). Therefore, production in Europe plummets to zero when the
minimum wage is set too high. In terms of production, the multinational ￿rm then resembles
an exporting ￿rm based in America. Without trading barriers any small positive deviation of
we from wa will result in zero production of multinational ￿rms in Europe. Note that in the
free-entry equilibrium the case of a multinational with just one factory producing positive out-
put levels will never occur. In fact, the multinational would choose to become a national ￿rm
based in the country with lower factor prices.
Increasing the European minimum wage may also a￿ect the level of production and thus labour
demand in America. American production will obviously be not a￿ected if the two countries are
closed economies without any trade taking place. Increases in the minimum wage only in￿uence
marginal costs of producers in Europe and since these ￿rms do not compete with American ￿rms
the latter are not a￿ected. On contrary, for the open economy case the following result can be
13established
Proposition 2. In an open economy setting with nonnegative intra-industry trade the output
of ￿rms based in America, Xn
ae and Xn
aa, will be positively a￿ected by increases in the European
wage rate, we.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Increases in we a￿ect marginal costs of ￿rms based in Europe but not those of ￿rms based in
America. Consequently the latter types of ￿rms improve their relative competitiveness and gain
ground on expense of the former. In an open economy setting, in which national ￿rms based
in both countries compete with each other, increases in the wage rate in Europe will therefore
cause ￿rms based in America to expand their production.
Finally, I am interested in the e￿ect of increases in we on the production of multinational en-
terprises for the American market. As long as the increase in we does not exceed a certain
threshold, multinationals are again equivalent to national ￿rms based in America that produce
for the domestic markets only. There will be no e￿ects on their output levels if multinational en-
terprises only compete with other multinationals or with national ￿rms based in America. When
competing with exporters based in Europe their output levels Xm
ea and Xm
aa will be positively
a￿ected as described in proposition 2. Whenever European wages are such that wec > wa(c+t)
the multinational will shift all its production to its American factory and therefore will be similar
to an American exporter in terms of production patterns.
3.2 E￿ects of an Increase in the European Wage on Potential Pro￿ts
Up to this point, I have taken the number of ￿rms in the market as given. However, changes in
the minimum wage will not only alter the behaviour of active ￿rms but also determine which
types of ￿rms enter the market. The decision is governed by free entry conditions. In this section,
I will brie￿y look at the e￿ects of an increase in the wage rate of Europe on potential pro￿ts of
the four types of ￿rms keeping all other endogenous variables constant. Using equations (14) -










pa ￿ we(c + t)
pa
￿2#







































￿ wa(G + F) + weG; (ma ￿ 0); (37)
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￿ wa(G + F) ￿ weG ￿ 0; (ma ￿ 0):(41)
Now consider an increase in the European minimum wage holding all other endogenous variables





a = 0: (42)
This ￿nding suggests that national ￿rms based in Europe will su￿er most from an increase in the
(implicit) minimum wage. Not only their marginal production costs but also their ￿xed costs
for headquarters and factories will increase. Multinational ￿rms headquartered in Europe are
less a￿ected as they produce their output for the American market in America. Multinationals
based in America have the additional advantage that ￿xed costs for their headquarters do not
depend on we. Finally, pro￿ts of American exporters are not at all a￿ected by the change.
Hence, altering the minimum wage in Europe will harm ￿rms based in Europe most and is likely
15to give rise to an equilibrium with heavy weight placed on ￿rms based in America.
Importantly, those ￿rms most bene￿cial for Home in terms of labour demand are a￿ected most
severely. Given production levels, a national ￿rm based in Europe will generate more labour
demand than a multinational based in Europe, with the latter demanding more labour than a
multinational based in America. Finally, national ￿rms based in America, which are not a￿ected
by the increase in we, do not demand any labour in Europe.
4 Numerical Simulation of the General Equilibrium
Now I compute the general equilibrium of the model described in section 2. 8 As in Markusen
and Venables (1998) the benchmark simulation sets trading costs t at 0:15. In order to focus
on labour regulations as the only source of heterogeneity, countries have identical endowment
levels of La = Le = 150 and Ra = Re = 50. The ￿xed costs of multinational enterprises are
1.45 times the ￿xed costs of national ￿rms when factor prices are equalised, ￿ equals 2=3, ￿
is 3=8.9 The European wage rate is set initially so that it equals the free market equilibrium
(we = 0:6). In order to study the e￿ect of a one-sided minimum wage in Europe the level of we
is then successively increased.
The e￿ects of the full-￿edged model are contrasted with those derived from a model without
multinational ￿rms and those of a closed-economy setting. For doing so, three di￿erent versions
of the model are simulated. First, exports and multinationals are suppressed reducing the model
essentially to a closed economy setting. Second, ￿rms are allowed to export but multinational
￿rms are still suppressed. As noted by Markusen and Venables (1998), the model then essentially
reduces to a two-factor version of Brander and Krugman (1983) and Venables (1985). Third,
both exporting ￿rms and multinational ￿rms are allowed to arise endogenously. Note that the
di￿erent versions of the model do not specify which type of ￿rm will arise endogenously but
only restrict the range of possible ￿rm types. There are also no limitations on the location of
the headquarters i.e. the respective ￿rm type might not arise in either country, only in one or
8The numerical calculations are conducted using the MCP solver of GAMS.
9The values of ￿ and ￿ are chosen so that the X sector plays a dominant role in determining labour demand
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Table 1: Type of Firms Active in Equilibrium
in both countries. Furthermore, the term ’closed economy’ refers to the X sector only. The
numeraire good is freely traded in all three settings.
The numerical simulation serves primarily to establish qualitative results but also to assess the
relative magnitudes of the e￿ects across the three settings. Quantitative impacts should be
interpreted with some caution given the simplifying features of the model. For instance, in
reality implicit minimum wages bind only for a fraction of workers. Hence, the quantitative
e￿ect of the wage ￿oor on overall unemployment rates is likely to be overstated. Since the same
simpli￿cations are present in all three model versions, relative magnitudes should nevertheless
have explanatory power.
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Figure 1: E￿ect of a European Minimum Wage on Unemployment
we and listed separately for the three di￿erent model settings. Positive numbers of national and
multinational ￿rms headquartered in country i = a;e are indicated by ni and mi, respectively.10
In the closed economy domestic ￿rms do not face foreign competition and will prevail in both
countries over the whole parameter space. With exports allowed the ￿rms located in America
will constantly gain in terms of relative competitiveness and domestic ￿rms based in Europe will
altogether quit the market at a minimum wage of 0 :81. Without imposing restrictions on the
￿rm types the initial equilibrium is characterised by coexisting multinational ￿rms. The table
shows that a relative small increase in European wages is su￿cient for all multinational ￿rms
based in Europe to displace their headquarters to American. Further increases in we bene￿t
national ￿rms based in America which are the only type of ￿rms whose costs are not a￿ected
by European wages. Consequently, for very high levels of we multinational ￿rms are no longer
pro￿table and American exporters will be left as the only active type of ￿rm. Interestingly, for
0:74 ￿ we ￿ 0:81 multinationals relocate from America to Europe, a ￿nding explained later in
this section.
Consider now the e￿ect of an increase in we on the level of unemployment in Europe as
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Figure 2: E￿ect of a European Minimum Wage on the European Income Level
depicted in ￿gure 1. Clearly, unemployment is on the rise for all three simulations. The closed
economy setting provides a lower bound to the other speci￿cations. Once ￿rms are allowed
to export, the e￿ect of one-sided downward rigidity on the unemployment rate is signi￿cantly
larger. One can also turn the result upside-down. A move from autarky to an open economy will
increase European unemployment. The simulation shows that the calculated unemployment rate
is more than twice as high over the complete parameter space. Firms based in America produce
ever larger shares of European consumption thereby reducing demand for European labour. In
general equilibrium, higher unemployment rates also cause income levels in Europe to fall more
rapidly compared to a closed economy setting (see ￿gure 2). Market size and production decline
even further.
Interestingly, the existence of multinational enterprises dampens the e￿ect over some range of
parameters as they keep larger parts of production in Europe. 11 Multinationals are less a￿ected
by changes in we than European exporters as parts of their (marginal and ￿xed) costs depend
11Note that the observed dampening e￿ect of multinational enterprises is only evident in a setting, in which
trading barriers are low enough for intra-industry trade to occur. If trading barriers are prohibitively high,
the open economy setting with exporting ￿rms will e￿ectively re￿ect a closed economy. Adding multinational
￿rms to such a scenario will raise the actual unemployment rate because multinational ￿rms will relocate their
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Figure 3: E￿ect of a European Minimum Wage on the Fraction of European X Consumption
Produced Domestically
on American factor prices only. Thus, they are able to compete with American exporters for
a wider range of values of the minimum wage. As long as multinationals are present in the
market, a fraction of domestic consumption of X is still produced in Europe. This is illustrated
in ￿gure 3 that also highlights that the sharp increase in unemployment coincides with the fall in
the fraction of XeC produced domestically. With lower unemployment rates purchasing power
in Europe initially declines only moderately. Thus, in the presence of MNEs not only a higher
fraction of European consumption is met with domestic production. The European market also
remains more important in terms of its size relative to the American counterpart. 12
Once all the production takes place in America, further increases in we only a￿ect Ue via the
impact on Y production. Consequently, the di￿erence between the open and closed economy
setting will diminish for larger values of we since in the former setting the domestic production
of X is still negatively a￿ected by increases in we.
The e￿ects resulting from an introduction of a wage ￿oor in Europe for the American wage
level are shown in ￿gure 5. National labour market legislation introduced in Europe has no
12Figure 10 in the Appendix depicts the fraction of worldwide X consumption produced in Europe thereby also
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Figure 5: E￿ect of a European Minimum Wage on European Welfare
21e￿ect on the American labour market in a closed economy. However, wage rigidity in Europe
props up wages in America when product markets are global. American ￿rms gain a relative
cost advantage vis-a-vis their competitors and will therefore produce larger amounts of X. This
raises labour demand and wages in America. As long as multinationals are pro￿table, the e￿ect
is somewhat less pronounced in the unrestricted setting since a lower fraction of the production
for the American market is transferred to America. After reaching a peak the wage level in
America is decreasing in we. This is so because further increases of wages in Europe generate
further unemployment and income losses in Europe. Demand for good X in Europe falls and so
does production and labour demand in America.
There is yet another interesting aspect evident from ￿gure 5. For a certain parameter range
the wage level is actually higher in America than in Europe despite of the (binding) minimum
wage in the latter. Why can such an equilibrium be sustainable? The reason is a sort of home
market e￿ect. While income levels in America are soaring, 13 unemployment in Europe depresses
local income and demand for X production. Therefore, national ￿rms based in America serve a
far larger domestic market than their counterparts in Europe. And since national markets are
somewhat shielded by trading barriers, American national ￿rms do have a competitive advantage
despite of higher domestic equilibrium wages.
In the presence of multinational enterprises wages in America are higher than in Europe for an
implicit minimum wage of between 0.75 and 0.81. Note that in this case there is a sudden shift
backwards to multinationals headquartered in Europe, since MNEs based in di￿erent countries
clearly do not have a home market advantage in comparison to each other. Hence, multinationals
will always locate their headquarters in the country with lower factor prices.
Finally, a note on the welfare consequences of the introduction of an implicit minimum wage.
After the preceding analysis it is hardly surprising that introducing downward wage rigidity
depresses consumption and, hence, welfare levels in Europe. For a given wage rigidity moving
from a closed to an open economy setting actually lowers welfare. This is an interesting result
in itself since it shows that there might be a case for protectionism in the presence of one-sided
wage rigidities. The adverse welfare e￿ects are somewhat dampened when multinational ￿rms














































t = 0.05 t = 0.15 t = 0.25 t = 0.35
Figure 6: E￿ect of a European Minimum Wage on Unemployment for Di￿erent Trading Costs
are allowed to enter.
5 The Role of Trading Barriers
The previous section has illustrated how the e￿ects of a one-sided minimum wage in an open
economy with multinationals di￿er from those in a closed economy or an open economy without
multinational ￿rms. It has been shown that the e￿ects of national labour market institutions
might be much more pronounced in a world in which product markets are linked globally.
Trading barriers are of great importance to the results as they determine the degree of openness
of an economy and the type of ￿rms active in equilibrium. With very high trading barriers
horizontal multinational enterprises are more likely to arise while exporting is relatively costly.
In this section, the unrestricted full-￿edged model is simulated for di￿erent levels of trading
barriers t = f0:05;0:15;0:25;0:35g to assess their in￿uence on the model’s main results.
Figure 6 provides an overview of the e￿ect of a one-sided minimum wage in Europe on the
unemployment rate. Consider ￿rst the cases in which t = f0:15;0:25;0:35g. The three curves
coincide for a range of parameters at the lower and the upper bound of we. For low and high levels






























t = 0.05 t = 0.15 t = 0.25 t = 0.35
Figure 7: E￿ect of European Minimum Wage on American Wages for Di￿erent Trading Costs
barriers. Introducing only a moderate minimum wage will prevent multinational enterprises
from leaving the market while at very high levels only national ￿rms based in America can
prevail.14
The e￿ect of the level of trading barriers is evident from the intermediate parameter range. With
relative low barriers exporters will enter the market already at relatively small values of we.
Labour demand for the production of the X good is transferred abroad and the unemployment
rate rises abruptly above the one calculated in simulations with higher trading barriers. A
comparably moderate minimum wage is su￿cient to generate high unemployment. With higher
levels of trading costs the entry barriers for exporting national ￿rms are higher. Therefore, the
‘turning point’, at which the fraction of X consumption produced abroad increases sharply, lies
at higher values of we. The range of parameters we consistent with multinational production is
enlarged while exporting ￿rms arise only at higher values of we. Hence, higher trading barriers
reduce the adverse e￿ects on unemployment in Europe for intermediate values of we.
Figure 7 provides the mirror image for the American labour market. Again, the curves coincide
for low and high levels of we. American wages are increasing initially as multinational enterprises
14A detailed table showing the types of ￿rms active for any combination of we and t is provided in the Appendix.
24are relocating their headquarters to America. A marked increase in wa can be observed once
American exporters start to produce higher fraction for the market in Europe. The lower the
level of trading barriers is the lower is the level of we su￿cient for the appearance of American-
based exporting ￿rms. Consequently, the positive e￿ect of implicit European minimum wages
on wages in America is higher with lower trading barriers for some intermediate parameter range
of we.
The two ￿gures also show that there is an interesting twist for t = 0:05. Note ￿rst that for trading
barriers of such small magnitude multinational enterprises will never arise since exporting is
almost costless. Moving from t = 0:15 to t = 0:05 can then actually decrease unemployment
in Europe in the case of a very high wage ￿oor. Intuitively, the very high unemployment rate
in Europe depresses income and market size. Worldwide consumption of X is then strongly
dominated by American demand. Very low trading barriers enables exporters from Europe to
access the American market and European labour bene￿ts since a fraction of American demand
is met with European production.
6 National Labour Supplies, Global Consequences
In this section I study the e￿ect of national factor supplies on the two labour markets. 15 In
line with Davis (1998) the ￿xed European minimum wage insulates America from any e￿ects
caused by factor accumulation in Europe. Figure 8 shows how American wages and European
unemployment vary with European labour endowment. As long as the minimum wage binds
labour supply has no e￿ect on factor prices in America and additional labour endowment will
add to the European unemployment stock. Hence, the unemployment rate is steeply increasing
in Le. On contrary, the relative cost competitiveness of American ￿rms and American labour
demand are not a￿ected by factor accumulation in Europe. Therefore, the American wage rate
is independent from European factor supplies.
The e￿ects of an increase in American labour supply, depicted in ￿gure 9, are more subtle.
Initially, there is a parameter range, in which American wages do not respond to domestic labour































































American Wage Rate European Unemployment
Figure 8: Labour Market Consequences of an Increase in European Labour Supply
supply and equal the (￿xed) wage in Europe. This result resembles the one of Davis (1998) who
￿nds that di￿erences in the accumulation of labour can not explain divergent wage trends.
The parameter space corresponds to a regime of multinational ￿rms based in both countries.
Increases in the American labour supply put downward pressure on American wages. More and
more multinationals move their headquarters from Europe to America increasing labour demand
in America and decreasing it in Europe. This allows America to sustain its wage level while
European unemployment soars.
Once all multinationals have relocated to America further factor accumulation leads to a decline
in American wages. The number of multinationals based in America increases only slightly and
no additional labour demand is generated from relocation of headquarters. In this parameter
space unemployment in Europe is hardly a￿ected by American factor accumulation. It even falls
somewhat as the (slightly) increasing number of multinationals based in America is accompanied
by a (slight) increase of production in Europe.
Further decreases in the American wage rate increase the competitiveness of national American
￿rms relative to their multinational competitors. As soon as national ￿rms enter the market,


































































American Wage Rate European Unemployment
Figure 9: Labour Market Consequences of an Increase in American Labour Supply
in American labour demand and depresses labour demand in Europe. Hence, American wages
and unemployment in Europe start to increase hand in hand. These developments also change
the relative size of the two markets and favour the establishment of national ￿rms based in
America. Further factor accumulation will lead to higher and higher American wages while
unemployment keeps on rising in Europe. The development comes to an end at the point at
which all production of the X good takes place in America and only national ￿rms are left in the
market. Further increases in American labour supply will then again depress American wages.
The unemployment rate in Europe is left unchanged since the X sector does not generate labour
demand any more. Thus, lower American wages do not in￿uence relative costs of European
￿rms as the latter do simply not exist.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper has studied the e￿ects of introducing a one-sided minimum wage in a model of
intra-industry trade and multinational ￿rms. Even though factor prices do not equalise across
countries, the overarching message of Davis (1998) is con￿rmed. National labour market regu-
lations profoundly interact and can not be analysed in isolation when goods markets are global.
27The result illustrates why rigid institutions might have contributed signi￿cantly to the European
unemployment problem even though they were already in place long before the problem actually
occurred. Moving towards a global world economy dramatically alters the outcome of labour
market rigidity.
The paper has shown that the adverse employment e￿ects of an asymmetric minimum wage are
much more pronounced in an open economy setting with positive intra-industry trade compared
to a framework without exporters. Perhaps surprisingly, multinational ￿rms do not worsen but
potentially mitigate the e￿ects somewhat. While there is no one-to-one relation between the
European minimum wage and the wage rate in America (as in Davis, 1998), a (binding) wage
￿oor in one country will prop up wages in the other. The magnitude of the e￿ects and the
di￿erences between the results derived in open and closed economy settings depend crucially on
the level of trading barriers.
In particular, (asymmetric) wage rigidities are likely to a￿ect employment prospects more
severely in economies with a high degree of openness than in economies that are shielded from
foreign competition by relatively high trading barriers. Consequently, wage ￿exibility appears
to be of speci￿c importance for the labour market performance in open economies. This ￿nd-
ing suggests that labour market reforms should indeed be directed towards a higher degree of
(wage) ￿exibility in the face of global competition. Alternatively, one may argue for more co-
ordination of labour market policies among countries. If institutions that cause wage rigidity
are - for whatever reason - perceived to play a bene￿cial role, adverse e￿ects can be reduced by
simultaneously introducing them in more than just one country. Since moving from a closed to
an open economy setting depresses welfare in the rigid-wage country, there might even be a case
for protectionism in the presence of one-sided wage rigidities.
The interaction of national labour market institutions is also illustrated with respect to the
e￿ects of local factor accumulation on global labour market outcomes. Factor accumulation in
Europe has no e￿ect on American wage rates which are protected by the binding European
minimum wage. Unemployment rates in Europe rise hand and hand with national labour en-
dowment. On contrary, the e￿ects of an increase in the American labour supply are more subtle.
28The direction generally depends on the level of the minimum wage and the resulting types of
￿rms active in equilibrium. In fact, factor accumulation in America can even increase American
wages.
The model lends itself to a number of extensions. The present study has, for instance, abstracted
from key elements that characterise the recent wave of economic integration. A central and novel
feature that has attracted a lot of academic and public attention has been the fragmentation
of production across national borders. Furthermore, trade with developing countries such as
China or India has soared. Adding elements of these features to the model may generate further
important insights into the interaction of national labour market regulations in a globalised
world.
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31A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. I start with di￿erentiating equations (32) and (33) with respect to we to ￿nd
"oe
@we
= cwa(c + t)
￿
￿n(n ￿ 1)
(nwa(c + t) ￿ c(n ￿ 1)we)2 ￿
2





= cwa(c + t)
￿
￿(n ￿ 1)n
(cnwa ￿ (n ￿ 1)(c + t)we)2 ￿
2
(cwa + (c + t)we)2
￿
< 0: (44)
Hence, the elasticities are decreasing in we. Next, one can calculate the wage rate, at which the
two elasticities exactly equal -1. For "oe this is true for we =
nwa(c+t)
c(3n￿2) , while for "oa one ￿nds
that we = cnwa
(c+t)(3n￿2) delivers an elasticity of -1. Hence, the following conditions have to be







(c + t)(3n ￿ 2)
: (46)
Consider ￿rst condition (45) referring to the wage elasticity of production for market e. From
equation (30) one can infer that for nonnegative levels of exports into the European market,
we has to be equal to or larger than
(n￿1)wa(c+t)
cn . Plugging this lower bound into equation (45)
leaves us with n￿1
n ￿ n
3n￿2, which is always ful￿lled for the assumption n ￿ 2. Similarly, for the
American market one can derive a lower bound for wh from equation (29) assuming Xn
aa > 0.16
Substituting into condition (46) yields again n￿1
n ￿ n
3n￿2.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2





￿Mec(2n ￿ 1)((3n ￿ 2)wa(c + t) ￿ cnwe)
n2(wa(c + t) + cwe)3 : (47)
16The assumption follows directly from assuming nonnegative intra-industry trade. A national ￿rm will always
produce for the domestic market provided that it is an exporter.
32This expression is nonnegative as long as we ￿
(3n￿2)wa(c+t)
cn . By plugging in the upper bound
for we as derived from equation (29), we ￿
nwa(c+t)
c(n￿1) , one obtains n
n￿1 ￿ 3n￿2
n . The assumption
n ￿ 2 guarantees that the condition is satis￿ed.
The derivative of production of a ￿rm based in America for its domestic market with respect to





￿Ma(2n ￿ 1)(c + t)(cwa(3n ￿ 2) ￿ nwe(c + t))
n2((c + t)we + cwa)3 (48)
The expression will be nonnegative for we ￿
cwa(3n￿2)
n(c+t) which can again be veri￿ed by plugging
in the upper bound of we.
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wh t = 0.05 t = 0.15 t = 0.25
Table 2: Type of Firms Active in Equilibrium for Di￿erent t Values
35